FROM: Tokyo (Matsuoka)

TO: Berlin

April 30, 1941

# 362.

Re your # 453 [a].

 Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire .  You are to use the LA [b] code especially for matters re visas and other matters that are not very secret. The HO [c] code or a machine code should be used for other matters of great secrecy.

 http://louisjsheehan.blogspot.com

[a] See 1, 259.

[b] A restricted code used by Japanese diplomatic officials.

[c] Thought to be the "KO" code—a code used by Japanese diplomatic officials for commercial matters.

Trans. 5-3-41

No. 261

FROM: Berlin (Kurusu)

TO: Tokyo

January 19, 1941

# 45.

From MORIYAMA in Brussels # 3.

Since we are not allowed to use code in Belgium I have requested the Embassy in Berlin to hold in safekeeping just as they are the codes attached to your secret communications of 1940.

Trans. 1-22-41

No.  262

FROM: Berlin (Kurusu)

TO: Tokyo

January 19, 1941

# 47.

I request that I be given permission to have this office transmit under custody the telegraphic codes which are being kept here and which should have been relayed to our Legation in Latvia and to the General Consulate in Anberusu. [a]

Please do not send any more messages to Anberusu [a] in the future.

[a] Anvers: Antwerp.

Trans. 1-22-41

No. 263

FROM: Washington (Nomura)

TO: Tokyo

March 10, 1941

No number.

Successive reports clearly indicate that the issue between the Axis and England and the United States is becoming ever more drastic. Furthermore, Anglo-American traditional relations are gradually becoming stronger. Today many of our people think that even though Great Britain goes under, the United States will not fight and that Japan can continue to maintain friendly relations with the United States, but that in truth is but an empty dream. If England is invaded we must expect to fight her and the United States. This goes without saying. Momentarily relations between Tokyo and Washington are following an ever more

Page A-142

tortuous road. I think you will agree that your trip to Europe is giving much anxiety to the United States officials and, depending upon the course of events, it might be a contributing factor to bringing the European war to the Far East. Now, what do you think of returning home via the United States. I have been thinking this over for several days and I think that in this way you might allay considerable anxiety on the part of the United States. Furthermore, you might thus contribute to the prestige of our country. Please wire me your opinions immediately.

Trans. 3-12-41

No.  264

FROM: Tokyo (Matsuoka)

TO: Moscow (Koshi)

March 3, 1941

# 230.

(Abstract)

The Foreign Minister will take four codes along with him on his trip to Europe. Therefore, in case of urgency, even while he is on the train, messages may be dispatched to him using any of the codes.

Trans. 3-5-41

No.  265

FROM: New Orleans (Ito)

TO: Tokyo

March 11, 1941

# 6.

Part 1 of 2 [a].

Secretary of the Navy KNOX flew here from Pensacola. While there he inspected the new shipbuilding yards and met naval reserve aviators. In addition, he inspected high-speed torpedo boats recently constructed. When he called on the 8th (or 9th) naval area here, he told the newspaper correspondents that he was going to fly to Puerto Rico on a naval plane. ----- ----- ----- He skeptically expressed the view that this country would become involved in the war within two or three months.

[a] Part 2 available, not translated.

Trans. 4-26-41

No.  266

FROM: Tokyo (Matsuoka)

TO: Mombasa

March 10, 1941

# 584.

(Circular).

In view of the fact that the present international situation has become very critical, I want you to get the following points well in mind concerning the disposal of secret documents:

1. So that you may dispose of them in the shortest possible time, separate them from the other documents and put them in some special place.

2. There may be some documents which you will need for reference in your daily work and which are very precious. You may leave these in the hands of your security official until such

Page A-143

time as it may appear urgent to destroy them; however, as for those for which you can see no future use, burn them to ashes immediately.

3. Have this done in strict secrecy under the supervision of your security official. Furthermore, incinerate these documents in such a manner as to prevent the fact leaking out. Be sure to send me an itemized list of all documents destroyed.

4. In case you have to move and transport your secret documents, please be sure this is done under the strict supervision of your security officer.

Trans. 3-14-41

No. 267

FROM: Santiago (Kawasaki)

TO: Tokyo (Gaimudaijin)

March 11, 1941

# 051.

Re your Circular # 584 [a].

The local Japanese merchants have withdrawn the greater part of their funds from America and in view of the fact that Japanese-Chilean relations may take a turn for the worse would it not be well to gradually transfer these funds to some safer place, such as, say, Argentina. Please advise by wire.

[a] See I, 266. Circular directing that all secret documents be burned immediately and to prevent the fact from leaking out.

Trans. 4-9-41

No.  268

FROM: Tokyo (Matsuoka)

TO: Rome

May 8, 1941

# 114.

Re your # 227 [a].

The wire from the Department of Communications is as follows:

Since I would like to be informed of plans for, and actual operation of counter-measures for air defense, after investigating all facts with regard to air defense conditions in the important cities of Russia, Germany, France, etc., please make a detailed report of appropriate methods inside and outside the country; and then send a special dispatch with regard to daily routines on the following:

1. Official and civilian organizations; in general, a counter policy.

2. The changes that are instituted upon damage to important communication facilities (including radio broadcasting), air bases, navigation route markings in harbors, and the emergency measures instituted.

3. Concentrate on warnings and intelligence communications contacts.

4. Steps with regard to emergency electric power supply and control of light.

5. Please send me any other essential information.

[a] Not available.

Trans. 5-12-41

Page A-144

No. 269

FROM: Tokyo

TO: Berlin

March 11, 1941

# 217.

Regarding your # 244 [a].

Some changes may be necessary due to conferences, but my schedule is as follows:

Arrive Berlin about the 17th or the 18th, proceed to Rome about the 3rd or the 4th. Return to Berlin two or three days later. Remain in Berlin two or three days and proceed to Moscow.

I wish to avoid traveling by plane as much as possible.

[a] Not available.

Trans. 3-13-41

No. 270

FROM: Berlin (Osima)

TO: Tokyo

March 26, 1941

# 311.

Strictly Secret.

One portion of Minister MATSUOKA's program is as follows. Please handle this in great secrecy. Inasmuch as we are not making a public announcement of this program all at one time here, please arrange to publish on each day the program for the following day.

The 26th.  6:00 P.M. Arrive at Anhalter station, taking up lodging in the          

                     Bellevue Palace. No functions are scheduled on that

                     day.

The 27th. 10:45 A.M. Will be presented with EHREN flowers.

          11:00 A.M. Interview with Foreign Minister VON RIBBENTROP.

           2:00 P.M. Lunch with VON RIBBENTROP.

           4:00 P.M. Interview with Chancellor HITLER.

           8:00 P.M. Banquet given by Foreign Minister VON RIBBENTROP.

The 28th. 11:00 A.M. An interview with Economic Minister FUNK.

           2:00 P.M. Lunch with Chancellor HITLER, followed by an inter-

                     view with German and foreign newspaper corres-

                     pondents.

           7:00 P.M. Meeting with the Japanese Society.

           8:00 P.M. Banquet given by Ambassador OSIMA.

The 29th.            Lunch with GOERING.

           6:00 P.M. Ambassadorial reception.

The 30th.            Sightseeing in Potsdam. Lunch with the Foreign

                     Minister (in the ancient palace).

           4:30 P.M. Leave Berlin for Rome.

Trans. 3-29-41

Page A-145

No.  271

FROM: Rome

TO: Moscow

March 18, 1941

No number.

Message to Tokyo # 153.

It was rumored about in the press club here in Rome that after Minister MATSUOKA's trip to Berlin and Rome, he is going to visit Vichy and London. The supposition was advanced that perhaps he was going to try some mediation in the European war. We shall have to be careful about such things as this.

Trans. 3-20-41

No.  272

FROM: Berlin

TO: Hsinking

March 12, 1941

# 45.

Concerning German-Yugoslav relations, I have received a confidential report from quarters connected with the Propaganda Department, according to which Yugoslavia will join the Tri-Partite Alliance on the occasion of Foreign Minister Matsuoka's arrival in Berlin.

Trans. 3-20-41

No. 273

FROM: Berlin (Osima)

TO: Tokyo

March 18, 1941

# 281.

To be handled in Government Code.

Today, the 18th, on the occasion of a talk with Foreign Minister RIBBENTROP, he told me that Yugoslavia will sign the Three-Power Treaty by means of a protocol within a few days. (The place is not yet decided.) He requested me to wire my government for authority to sign immediately.

Trans. 3-19-41

No.  274

FROM: Tokyo (Konoe)

TO: Berlin

March 19, 1941

# 248.

Re your # 281 [a].

As I have completed reporting this matter to the Emperor on the 10th, please sign in the usual manner.

[a] See I, 273. Yugoslavia is joining Tripartite Pact. I request permission to sign for Japan.

Trans. 3-20-41

Page A-146

No. 275

FROM: Tokyo (Konoe)

TO: Moscow

March 20, 1941

# 291.

To be handled in Government Code.

To Minister MATSUOKA.

# 248 from this Minister Pro-Tem to the Ambassador in Germany. Re your # 281 [a].

On the 19th of this month I took this petition to the Emperor; therefore, please sign your name in accordance with precedent.

[a] See I, 273; in which Berlin informs Tokyo that Yugoslavia will sign the Three-Power Treaty by means of a protocol within a few days.

Trans. 3-22-41

No.  276

FROM: Berlin (Osima)

TO: Tokyo

March 26, 1941

# 310.

On the 25th in Vienna, after signing the protocol for the participation of Yugoslavia in the Tripartite Agreement, when I talked with Chancellor HITLER, he said he would make an opportunity for an informal and intimate exchange of opinions inasmuch as Foreign Minister MATSUOKA has deliberately made a long trip to Germany in connection with future Japanese-German cooperation.

Trans. 3-29-41

No.  277

FROM: Tokyo

TO: Berlin

March 14, 1941

# 224.

Strictly Secret. Message to Moscow # 262.

Re your # 279 [a].

I expect to stay in Moscow two days and would like to leave at 11:00 p.m. on the 25th; however, if my plans described in my # 260 turn out satisfactorily, I would stay one day longer.

Relayed to Germany.

[a] Not available.

Trans. 3-13-41

Page A-147

No.  278

FROM: Tokyo

TO: Berlin

March 1 1941

# 222.

Message to Moscow # 260.

On the occasion of my trip to Europe I am very anxious, if possible, to try to get the Russians to accept the Ribbentrop proposal. Now, in order to achieve this, I would like to have interviews with MOLOTOV and STALIN. Through an exchange of views I think it is quite possible that I might dispel the deep-seated suspicion and doubt entertained by the Kremlin. If you agree with me, please negotiate for these interviews and wire back to the Home Office and also to our Minister in Hsinking. This message was sent to Berlin.

Trans. 3-13-41

No.  279

FROM: Moscow (Tatekawa)

TO: Harbin

March 14, 1941

# 5.

(Separate message to Foreign Minister Matsuoka # 1)

Re your # 260 [a].

1. I must point out that German-Soviet relations have changed considerably very recently because of the Balkan situation. In our three-way relations with Moscow we must do nothing without previously consulting fully with the German statesmen themselves.http://louisjsheehan.blogspot.com

2. In an interview I have had with STALIN I got the impression that even though you conferred with MOLOTOV you have no chance of getting any clearer idea of the prospect for future Japanese-Soviet relations and that you might even damage the situation.

3. Therefore, I think that you had better follow your pre-arranged schedule and make arrangements to leave here at midnight on the 25th. Ambassador OSIMA is of the same opinion.

Relayed to Tokyo.

[a] See I, 278.

Trans. 3-19-41

No. 280

FROM: Washington (Nomura)

TO: Tokyo (Gaimudaijin)

April 1, 1941

No number.

Action Rome as # ?.

To Minister Matsuoka:

Wakasugi was told by Roy Howard that should the Minister choose to return to Japan by way of the United States, following his visits to Germany and Italy, and if arrangements could be made for him to meet the President and other influential persons, the extremely tense relations which exist between the two countries may be considerably eased.

Page A-148

All arrangements for the duration of the Minister's stay in the U.S. could be left up to "HA" (Howard ?) who will undoubtedly make the same efforts as those he made when the Minister passed through the U.S. on his return from Geneva in 1933, he said.

Wakasugi was thus urged to send a cable to the Minister to advise him to come to the U.S.

Taking into consideration the Minister's mission on this trip as well as his schedule and various other factors, Wakasugi hesitated to do so.

Last night a special messenger from (Howard's Washington office ?) called on Wakasugi, and said that arrangements for the Minister to meet with the President, as well as for reserving a seat on a plane from (Lisbon ?) have already unofficially been made, and only await the Ministers agreement to come to the U.S.

Wakasugi was thus urged again to dispatch the cable to the Minister.

We realize, of course, that undoubtedly the Minster's schedule has already been definitely decided upon. However, in view of the fact that it is reported that even the Presidential circles would welcome the visit, and moreover, because the above mentioned person is so sincerely eager about it, we would appreciate some reply from the Minister to pass on to him.

According to what the special messenger let drop to Wakasugi, Howard is anxious to go to China and Japan after the Minister meets with the President, as a confidential emissary of the President, to act as mediator between Japan and China. Unofficially, he has already obtained the approval of persons very close to the President, he said.

This message has been sent to Tokyo.

Trans. 4-4-41

No. 281

FROM: Moscow (Tatekawa)

TO: Washington (Koshi)

April 7, 1941

# 1.

From Matsuoka. Regarding your message to Italy.

Please convey the following to HAWAADO [a].

The telegram reached me after my departure from Germany and as I am now on my way home I regret very much that I cannot act upon your suggestion. However, please accept my sincere appreciation for your interest in American-Japanese relations and in world peace. Please also convey my good wishes to the President for his good will. This message has also been sent to Tokyo.

[a] Roy Howard. See I, 280.

Trans. 4-9-41

No. 282

FROM: Rome

TO: Tokyo

April 1, 1941

# 182.

(Abstract)

 Matsuoka reports on his audience with the King of Italy. The King points out that Japan is indeed very fortunate in being so placed geographically as to escape the horrors of air attacks. Matsuoka said that Japan was unified in its respect for Italian fighting and is completely in

Page A-149

sympathy with Italy's aims. Matsuoka expresses gratitude for the expression of welcome given him on his arrival. After audience, all members of the party were given decorations.

Trans. 4-9-41

No. 283

FROM: Rome

TO: Tokyo

April 2,1941

# 184.

From Minister MATSUOKA.

On the afternoon of the 1st I had an interview with Foreign Minister CIANO (45 minutes long) which continued into my conversations with Premier MUSSOLINI (lasting 1 hour and 10 minutes). Both men welcomed me from their hearts. The general trend of the war against England was explained in as detailed a manner as possible by CIANO and summarized by MUSSOLINI, as was also the situation in the Mediterranean and North African areas. Some very instructive opinions were exchanged.

In summing up my interview with MUSSOLINI (though we used English, on occasion CIANO interpreted), he recalled our extremely frank and pleasant interview of eight years ago. Though we did not go very deep during the course of the conversations, MUSSOLINI remarked that his close collaboration with HITLER was very strong and that there was not the slightest breach between the two countries. With regard to the future aspect of the war, too, he exhibited an optimistic attitude. And again, MUSSOLINI referred to the attitude of the Soviet, but expressed the opinion that the Soviet would make no move. Furthermore, Germany and Italy were endeavoring to avoid all complications with that country. But putting first things first, at the present time relations with the United States were of the greatest importance. The United States was carrying out a policy of deliberately provoking war. And again, in respect to the Balkan situation, the Yugoslavian crisis will be settled without much ado. The Grecian question, as it relates to the Yugoslavian situation, is of great importance. Discussion was omitted on other points.

Though MUSSOLINI spoke with great feeling, our conversations from start to finish were in good humor. His health seemed to be excellent. Aside from the fact that he is getting older, it would be hard to say that he has changed much with the passage of the years. He revealed a great deal of self-confidence.

Now, Ambassador HORIKIRI sat in these conversations with me.

Relayed to England, Washington, Germany and Russia.

Trans. 4-3-41

No.  284

FROM: Rome

TO: Tokyo

April 2, 1941

# 185.

From Foreign Minister MATSUOKA.

During the talk with MUSSOLINI referred to in my message # 184 [a] I explained to him the Japanese peace plans in China and relations between Japan and the Nanking Government, and said that should there be any change in the situation upon my return to Japan I would let him know the status quo. Further, I said that when I find that the conditions warrant it I

Page A-150

may ask the several countries to recognize the Nanking Government. MUSSOLINI answered definitely that he is willing to announce the recognition at any time the Japanese Government so desires.

[a] See I, 283.

Trans. 4-4-41

No. 285

FROM: Rome (Horikiri)

TO: Tokyo

April 2, 1941

# 186.

From Foreign Minister MATSUOKA.

On the morning of the 2nd for an hour and fifteen minutes I had an interview with the Pope. The Pope took an utterly detached attitude, free of any favoritism regarding the European war, and approached the question from the point of view of a general peace throughout the world. After talking with him on various topics along these lines, I had a conversation with Cardinal MAGLIONI, the Vatican Secretary of State. He also, in a purely objective and detached manner, went on to say that the Pope always prays for peace, and, if the Catholic Church can do anything at all for us in settling our trouble with China, he will be ever so glad to offer his good offices.

Trans. 4-3-41

No.  286

FROM: Rome (Horikiri)

TO: Harbin (Riyohi)

March 13, 1941

No number.

Action Tokyo as # 146.

According to information here the Vatican is expecting a visit from Matsuoka when he passes through here. Inasmuch as this is an historic meeting between the Pope and a statesman, the Pope is awaiting the interview with satisfaction for he feels that it will be the means of contributing to the removal of all barriers to Catholic missionary work in Japan in the future.

Trans. 3-19-41

No. 287

FROM: Rome

TO: Moscow

March 17, 1941

No number.

Action Tokyo as # 149.

According to reports here the Vatican has ordered its representative to convey to Matsuoka the Vatican's feelings of satisfaction toward the Japanese government upon the occasion of his visit to Europe. The Vatican desires the opportunity of expressing to the Japanese Empire the profitable relations that exist between it and Japan and particularly its satisfaction in

Page A-151

regard to Japan's anti-Comintern policy. It appears as if the Vatican were going to make some such sort of a proposal and I would appreciate a telegram bearing on this immediately.

Relayed to Germany and Russia.

Trans. 3-18-41

No.  288

FROM: Tokyo (Konoe)

TO: Berlin

March 18, 1941

# 680.

(Circular.) Message to Rome # 79.

Strictly Secret.

Re your # 149 [a].

I have as yet received no such request.

[a] See I, 287.

Trans. 3-20-41

No.  289

FROM: Rome

TO: Washington

April 12, 1941

No number.

Message to Tokyo as # 222 on the 12th.

According to a report from the same source as that mentioned in my # 156 [a], the Papal Envoy to the United States had a conversation with President Roosevelt on Foreign Minister MATSUOKA's visit to His Holiness. ROOSEVELT stated: "Well, I have great doubts as to the possibility of Japan's intention to maintain peace in the Pacific and in the South Seas, as well as the possibility of a peaceful settlement of the trouble between Japan and the United States in the Far East. Foreign Minister MATSUOKA's visit to Europe makes it appear that his country is gradually tying in closer and closer with the Axis and is drawing ever nearer participation in the war. I think that Japan is placing the possibility of joining the war as a sort of scarecrow in the way of American assistance to Great Britain and the exercise of America's policy toward the Far East, the Pacific and the South Seas." On this point ROOSEVELT seemed extremely pessimistic. At the time ROOSEVELT also warned that he approved CHIANG KAI SHEK's sending a diplomatic envoy to the Vatican. In this connection I understand also that the Papal Envoy in London wired the Vatican that the British Government hopes that the desires of China will be given due consideration by His Holiness.

Relayed to Washington, London and Berlin. Relay to -----.

[a] Tokyo circular to Moscow tells of a conversation between the Italian Ambassador and Commercial Attaché HIDAKA in Shanghai with respect to MATSUOKA's endeavors to make peace with Chungking and likelihood of MATSUOKA bettering relations between Tokyo and Moscow.

Trans. 4-15-41

Page A-152

No. 290

FROM: Rome

TO: Washington

April 28, 1941

No number.

Message to Tokyo # 251.

Mr. TITTOMAN, Commercial Attaché of the American Embassy here in Rome, was accredited to the Vatican not long ago and since the 22nd has been conferring with the Pope. According to an intelligence from the Vatican, the Pope intends to mediate between Japan and the United States in the Far Eastern and Pacific trouble in order to eliminate the danger of the war extending into the Pacific. That is why Mr. TITTOMAN was accredited to the Vatican. The report goes on to say that His Holiness has convinced President ROOSEVELT of his sincerity in endeavoring to settle the East Asia and China problems in a peaceful manner. It also seems that TITTOMAN has already carried on tentative conversations on this question with the high prelates of the Church of Rome. I am sending this to you as I heard it. This is all for the moment.

Relayed to Washington.

Trans. 5-1-41

No.  291

FROM: Rome

TO: Moscow

March 25, 1941

No number.

Action Tokyo as # 168.

The following is intelligence received from Vatican circles:

The Apostolic Delegate in Chungking reports that Chiang Kai-Shek is planning to send his personal envoy by air in the near future, to the Vatican. The purpose of this visit is to counter the European visit of Foreign Minister Matsuoka.

The United States is said to have given this proposed visit its complete approval. It is even likely that the U.S. will recommend to the Vatican that it—the Vatican—lend a sympathetic ear to Chiang's emissary.

Since we would like to know how reliable our informant is, we would appreciate your advising us if you have any definite information regarding this matter.

Relayed to Germany and Russia.

Trans. 4-3-41

No.  292

FROM: Rome (Horikiri)

TO: Tokyo

April 3, 1941

# 188.

From Minister Matsuoka:

This Minister and his party will leave Rome on the 3rd for Berlin. Leave Berlin on the 5th for Moscow. Leave Moscow on the 10th for home.

Please make up a resume of reactions of various countries to my European journey and telegraph same to Berlin and Moscow. Nakanishi and Kuboi will remain in Berlin.

Trans. 4-9-41

Page A-153

No. 293

FROM: Berlin

TO: Tokyo (Gaimudaijin)

April 5, 1941

# 369.

From Foreign Minister Matsuoka:

In compliance with Hitler's request, I called on him on the afternoon of the 4th. After reporting to him my talks with Mussolini, Ciano and the Pope, we settled down to some straightforward talks, during which I asked Hitler, in view of the German-Japanese relations, to issue necessary instructions to have conveyed to Japan any special knowledge gained through Germany's experiences in the present war and also all information regarding new inventions. Whereupon, he agreed to do so at once.

Relayed to Italy, Russia, U.S. Russia relay to England.

Trans. 4-7-41

No.  294

FROM: Berlin

TO: Washington

April 5, 1941

No number.

Action Tokyo as # 378.

From Foreign Minister Matsuoka.

On the 5th I made a parting call on Foreign Minister Ribbentrop and our conversation extended into my having dinner with him. There was nothing in our conversation that was of sufficient importance to require an immediate communication, except to mention that Mr. Ribbentrop is very enthusiastic about the Mixed Committee of Experts.

When I asked him to bend all his efforts toward bringing about the conference of the economic and military committees, he agreed to do so willingly.

The impression gained from talking with the heads of the German and Italian governments regarding the Yugoslavian-Greek situation is that an early settlement is definite but the possibility of effecting this without open hostilities is very slight.

Relayed to Italy and Russia. Russia relay to England.

Trans. 4-8-41

No.  295

FROM: Tokyo (Konoe)

TO: Moscow (Koshi)

April 7, 1941

# 351.

Received from Berlin as # 383.

To Minister Matsuoka.

On the evening of the 7th I called on Foreign Minister Ribbentrop at his request, on which occasion he stated that he was highly pleased with your recent visit to Germany and that he was happy to have had the opportunity to talk over various matters with you. He then explained that what he was about to suggest was strictly his own idea, which he had not yet discussed even with Hitler and spoke as follows:

Page A-154

"The Yugoslavian coup d'etat which was staged the day after Yugoslavia joined the Tripartite Pact, in complete disregard of the agreement, is an insult not only to Germany but to all other members of the pact. While Germany does not expect Japan's help in European affairs, and while I realize that the legal situation of Japan as regards the pact is somewhat different from that of Germany and Italy, due to the ad referendum provision attached to the signature, it is nevertheless my hope that something might be done in the way of diplomatic reprimand by Japan for Yugoslavia's misbehavior.

"I would certainly talk over this matter with Minister Matsuoka, if he were still in Berlin, but since he has already gone to Moscow, I would like you to get in touch with him and get his opinion before he leaves."

In reply, I told him that Japan has no diplomatic representatives in Yugoslavia and that I doubted whether there is even a Yugoslavian honorary consul in Tokyo, but as I feel that this matter requires consideration I will telegraph Minister Matsuoka at once.

My opinion on this matter is that we should do no more than to publicly announce, through the Foreign Office spokesman, that Japan considers highly improper the recent acts of Yugoslavia and under these circumstances Japan regards the German and Italian move against Yugoslavia as justifiable.

Trans. 4-17-41

No. 296

FROM: Berlin

TO: Tokyo

April 6, 1941

# 381.

On the 6th I called on Vice Minister WEISAECKER and received from him an explanation of the German military invasion of Yugoslavia and Greece. The details are as follows:

1. The Invasion forces are principally made up of the German armed forces in Bulgaria who have started their southward march from Sophia to Salonika. In order to drive a wedge between Greece and Yugoslavia, one arm has started to move toward Skoplje [a]. Belgrade is, at the present time, being bombed. Furthermore, the Danube river has already crossed on the Rumanian-Yugoslavian border at the Iron Gate.

2. The new Yugoslavian cabinet has become an out-and-out war cabinet, especially in view of the fact that Premier SIMOVITCH announced to the Italian Minister on the 8th that in the event that the armed forces of a certain country moved against Salonika, Yugoslavia would immediately attack Albania. As Yugoslavia's determination to fight was clear, Germany, without loss of time, demonstrated her determination to attack Yugoslavia and Greece simultaneously. Though Yugoslavia had already mobilized, she had as yet not completed her development. Taking advantage of this, Germany commenced firing.

3. Italy will fight beside Germany. Hungary, too, will soon take up the fight. Romania will follow past practice. Bulgaria will not fight at the beginning. Her troops will chiefly be concentrated on the Turkish border. For Bulgaria to fight might arouse Turkey. We do not anticipate any movement by Turkey. In spite of the fact that the Soviet just the other day entered into a non-aggression agreement with Yugoslavia, Germany considers it but a saucy gesture and does not expect her to give any vital assistance. Above all, Germany certainly will not forget that at this critical juncture the Soviet has seen fit to quibble.

Page A-155

4. Until the German ministers in Yugoslavia and Greece have been returned to Germany in safety, Yugoslavian and Greek ministers are being held in a certain hotel in Southern Germany.

[a] City in Yugoslavia.

Trans. 4-9-41

No. 297

FROM: Tokyo (Matsuoka)

TO: Moscow (Koshi)

January 7, 1941

# 028.

(CIRCULAR). Action Moscow to London No. Nr.

(Confidential) Please advise of treatment of foreign correspondents in the country to which you are accredited. We wish to know so that we may know better how to reciprocate. Please send an immediate reply by cable, and follow it with details by mail:

1. Change in treatment of correspondents subsequent to the outbreak of the war.

2. Restrictions concerning ----- and -----,

3. Regulations concerning registration and/or identification (differentiation between regular and temporary or emergency correspondents; differentiation between newspaper correspondents and magazine writers).

4. Activities of associations or clubs and their connections with government circles.

5. Special privileges with regard to traveling and going on inspection tours, other courtesies, and special privileges granted in connection with these men's daily activities (crossing of emergency lines; establishing of telephone facilities; obtaining of gasoline in the event that purchases are restricted by ration cards; fuel; food; etc.).

6. Censoring of cables and mails; restrictions on usage of international telephone communications.

Trans. 1-28-41

No. 298

FROM: Rome (Horikiri, Ambasciatore Giappone)

TO: Tokyo (Gaimudaijin)

January 9, 1941

# 024.

Re your Circular # 28 [a].

1. Press reports censored. Must be dispatched in English, French, German, or Italian. No other changes in handling.

2. None.

3. Identification cards issued by Propaganda Ministry only to regular correspondents.

4. There is a foreign correspondent's association. It owns its own building and its members are treated in the same manner as diplomats. The Ministry of Propaganda apparently subsidizes this to a certain extent.

5. Train fare is reduced 70% for correspondents. The identification cards referred to in paragraph 3 bear a stamp of the chief of police on the backs of them, permitting the holder to cross emergency lines. Ration card restrictions are eased insofar as gasoline consumption is con-

Page A-156

cerned (four cylinder cars are allowed 80 liters per month; six cylinder cars, one hundred liters). Foreign correspondents are exempted from income tax payments.

6. Nothing particular to note other than the points brought out last year. [a]

[a] See I, 297.

Trans. 1-29-41

No. 299

FROM: Moscow (Tatekawa)

TO: Washington

(Revised Translation)

April 8, 1941

No number.

Message to Tokyo as # 422.

(Part 1 of 3).

Strictly secret.

From Foreign Minister MATSUOKA:

Today, the 8th, I was invited to an unofficial luncheon by United States Ambassador to Moscow, STEINHARDT. When we had finished eating we went into an adjoining room and had a confidential conversation. STEINHARDT, TATEKAWA and I sat in a triangle and for four hours we conferred. Ambassador STEINHARDT is an extremely frank man. He has constantly worried over Japanese-American relations. He has worried over them deeply and would like to do anything he can to improve them. On March 24th he called on me and we talked about what was said in your message # 338 [a] to Moscow. I told Mr. Steinhardt my frank opinion concerning relations between Tokyo and Washington and then made this statement: "When I say that President ROOSEVELT is the biggest gambler in the United States, I mean that he seems to think that the odds are even. Make no mistake! If this is true, Japanese-American relations, nay the peace of all this world, depends upon but one cast of the die. Please ask the President if he won't at least trust me, if not Japan, and take a chance. I mean to say that, upholding her integrity, Japan is going to see this through. He should believe this, and send word to CHIANG KAI SHEK that CHIANG should settle his trouble with Japan at the conference table and restore a general peace; that otherwise the United States will withhold all assistance. This, I believe, would be the royal road to peace between Japan and China."

In today's conversation Ambassador STEINHARDT said: "I wired that directly to the President at the time; confidentially because I suspect that that was what you wished me to do."

[a] See I

Trans. 4-11-41

Page A-157

No. 300

FROM: Moscow (Tatekawa)

TO: Washington

April 8, 1941

No number.

Message to Tokyo as # 422.

(Part 2 of 3).

I replied, "Yes, and I want you to transmit that to him once again. If, in the capacity of President, he will do this, I will guarantee that in less than a week after I get back to Tokyo a note of general pacifism will be sounded." Ambassador STEINHARDT promised, "I will wire him that." He then frankly asked, "While Your Excellency was visiting Berlin, did not Japan again commit herself? To this I replied, "There was no such question as that, nor was there any necessity of a further commitment. The Alliance Pact is as has been publicly announced. No commitment over and above that is necessary." The Ambassador again questioned me, saying "Did not the Germans, in order to involve Japan in the war, impress upon you that they were going to declare war upon the United States?". I announced, "As I have already publicly declared, the basis of the Axis Pact, its very premise, is to limit the scope of the present war, particularly to prevent the participation of the United States. Not one iota of divergence can be found between the view of the Germans and that of myself, that an end of hostilities is desirable without the loss of a day, and that no trouble is desired with the United States. In this point there has been not a ghost of a chance, but if the United States throws down the gauntlet, most certainly we will stand up and fling it back. However, believe me, Germany's desire for peace with the United States is sincere. You know she is not going to declare war on the United States. She is doing everything she can to prevent arousing the feelings of the American people."

Trans. 4-11-41

No. 301

FROM: Moscow (Tatekawa)

TO: Washington

April 8, 1941

No number.

Message to Tokyo as # 422.

(Part 3 of 3).

"I hope that you also will take the same attitude towards us; therefore, in my recent conversations in Berlin when the Germans voiced this sentiment I merely echoed it. I, myself, am absolutely certain that Germany will not declare war on the United States." The Ambassador seemed extremely worried, seeing which I promised: "All right then, I will wire this to Tokyo and if I receive a reply before I leave Moscow, I will let you know." Our conversation seemed to be drawing to a close and the Ambassador said with particular emphasis: "You had by all means better get in contact with the President of the United States." In conclusion I stated: "Please tell the President and the Secretary of State 'hello' for me and be sure to tell Secretary HULL this: 'Use a little imagination! Now, if Your Excellency were myself, that is to say, the present Foreign Minister of Japan, try to imagine just what sort of activities you would engage in in Berlin and Rome. If you can imagine that, you can pretty well understand what I did!" Judging from the manner of speaking and attitude of the American Minister in today's

Page A-158

conversation, and thinking of it in connection with what ROY HOWARD recently had to say, I believe that the President of the United States is soon going to take some measures against me. That is why I wire you this.

Relayed to London, Washington, Berlin and Rome.

Trans. 4-10-41

No. 302

FROM: Berlin

TO: Tokyo

May 3, 1941

# 480.

Of late it is rumored here that Foreign Minister Matsuoka will visit the United States. Domei carried a report on the 30th of April of a statement by spokesman Ishii of the Information Board to the effect that Germany and Italy had been asked whether they would be against the Foreign Minister going to the United States, and that they had stated that the United States is a neutral with respect to the European war, and are not at war with Germany and Italy. This gives the impression that there must be some grounds for the said rumors.

Of late the United States are, as a matter of fact, very near to participating in the war, and by their assistance to Britain, practically speaking, are of the nature of an enemy to Germany and Italy. At such a time as this when the German newspapers are scathing in their attacks upon, not only Britain, but America as well, even though the German authorities are outwardly expressing no opinions on this matter, and the newspapers are treating it with silent contempt, I think it is obvious that they would inwardly be giving it serious concern. However, I wish you would advise at once as to the truth of this rumor. [a]

Relayed to Switzerland.

[a] See I, 303.

Trans. 5-6-41

No. 303

FROM: Tokyo (Japanese Foreign Minister)

TO: Washington, Rome (Koshi)

May 5, 1941

# 1001.

(Circular). Action Berlin as # 373.

Regarding your # 480 [a].

I have been asked the same question by both the Italian and German Ambassadors. I told them that although I do not suspect that the United States government is desirous to have me visit the United States, I have absolutely no intention of going. On the 4th, at Kioto, on my way to the Ise shrine, I replied to reporters' questions regarding my American visit as follows: "I already know America well so there is no need of my going to America but I would rather like to have President Roosevelt and Secretary Hull come here so that they can fully understand actual conditions and the true intentions of Japan."

Please convey the above to both attaches.

This message has been sent to Italy and your message together with this message have been sent to England, U.S.S.R., and the United States.

[a] See I, 302.

Trans. 5-5-41

Page A-159

No. 304

FROM: Tokyo

TO: Berlin

May 10, 1941

# 396.

Part 1 of 2.

Re your # 494 [a].

This matter has been under consideration by this Minister since last year and is in keeping with the instructions which I gave him at the time he assumed his post. Since that time the Ambassador has been following a course outlined by me. He has to date gone thus far. While I was at home ROY HOWARD (an old friend of mine) expressed the hope that on returning from Europe I would visit the United States. Though I would have liked to do so I felt con" strained. There were two considerations of -----. At a later date in Moscow through the American Ambassador there (an exceptionally intimate friend), I asked him:

1. To make clear to the President and the Secretary of State that, should the United States consider participating in the war, in the event of such participation, needless to say, Japan in fulfillment of her pledge outlined in the Tripartite Agreement would also be forced to participate.

2. And to advise the President to counsel CHIANG KAI SHEK to respond to Japanese peace overtures and with this end in view to lend all aid that peace could be brought about.

I stated that it was my wish that a summarization of the above be transmitted to the President and the Secretary of State.

Translator's Note: The last half of this message was very badly garbled.

[a] Not available.

Trans. 5-13-41

No. 304A

FROM: Tokyo (Matsuoka)

TO: Berlin

May 10, 1941

# 396.

Part 2 of 2.

As a result of considerable thought by the Government of the United States and after discussions with Ambassador NOMURA, one draft was worked out. This was communicated to me by the Ambassador upon my return to Tokyo. Inasmuch as our contacts along this line require the utmost secrecy, we are keeping it very quiet in all quarters and we are at the present time very cautiously considering the pros and cons of this matter. Should there be any inquiries in this connection from any source, I want you to reply that you know nothing about it.

Regardless of what understanding is reached between Japan and the United States, we are determined that it shall not even to the slightest extent affect our position in the Tripartite Agreement. Foreign Minister VON RIBBENTROP is fully aware of the details of the situation and is well acquainted with the personal views of this Minister. Until you have received definite telegraphic instructions to the contrary, I would like you to avoid making reference to a single detail of this matter. http://louisjsheehan.blogspot.com On this point, I too, am being most circumspect. I am convinced that in this matter there is nothing which could bring about VON RIBBENTROP's misunderstanding.

Trans. 6-13-41 http://louisjsheehan.blogspot.com

Page A-160

No. 305

FROM: London (Japanese Ambassador)

TO: Washington

April 16, 1941

# 40.

Message to Tokyo as # 260.

Special wire.

1. Will Germany, without command of sea or command of British daylight air, be able to invade and conquer Great Britain in the Spring, Summer or Autumn of 1941? Will Germany try to do so?

Would it not be in the interest of Japan to wait until these questions have answered themselves?

2. Will German attack on British shipping be strong enough to prevent American aid from reaching British shores and United States transforming their whole industry to war purposes?

3. Did Japan's accession to the "Triple" Pact make it more likely or less likely that the States would come into the present war?

4. If the United States entered the war at the side of Great Britain, and Japan ranged herself with the "Axis" powers, would not the naval superiority of the two-English-speaking nations enable them to deal with Japan while disposing of the Axis powers in Europe?

5. Is Italy a strength or burden to Germany? Is the Italian fleet as good at sea as on paper? Is it as good on paper as it used to be?

Trans. Not dated

No.  306

FROM: London

TO: Washington

April 18, 1941

# 45.

Message to Tokyo # 277.

Strictly Secret.

(Part 2 of 2).

Assuming that it is our duty to join this war, we should choose the moment judiciously. For us to plunge precipitately into the struggle at the present moment would not be to the best interests of the Axis powers. (I do not think that Berlin and Rome ever expect us to take immediate action). However, when it appears that the war is reaching a conclusive stage, we should join the fight. I mean to say that when both England and the United States have exhausted their national strength and when the situation would be made decisive by Japan's participation, we certainly should take the plunge. But up to that time we should grant our Allies assistance short of war. That would be the best thing we could do not only for ourselves but also for Germany and Italy.

3. In a word, the exercise of our basic policy must be determined first and foremost by our national strength. That is the primary consideration. Nations who now plunge hastily into this war, and I mean even the United States, are going to dissipate their stamina. Countries that remain aloof like Soviet Russia, and none save these, occupy a favorable position. Every indication points to this. I think that this last point merits our most profound consideration.

Relayed to Washington.

Trans. 4-22-41

Page A-161

No. 307

FROM: London

TO: Washington

May 7, 1941

# 052.

(Action Tokyo as # 326) (In 2 parts—complete).

A continuation of my # 309 [a].

I. As the war in Poland rapidly grew into a general conflict, the war's second period began with the entry of Great Britain. The third period will be marked by Germany's breaking through British efforts on the continent, and the war will have become a contest of technical skills. The fourth period, likewise, will be action in the Mediterranean and will be a blow at the backbone of the British colonial empire, and will decisively determine the outcome of the war. The fate of Great Britain itself will be determined in the Atlantic, but that of the colonies depends upon the struggle in the Mediterranean.

The struggle for Iraq is very important; the occupation of the Aegean and the Dodecanese Islands, which form connecting links with Greece proper, will force Turkey to surrender after being encircled, and Syria likewise.

The British may be expected to take especially strong measures to oppose German diplomatic-military aggression in the Mosul region. Egypt will then become the focal point of operations in the Mediterranean.

II. The present general trends of future developments in the war seem to be;

American activity will be determined by British needs, and will increase (Churchill's speech at the time of the French surrender) in order to prevent a British surrender;

If such a defeat should occur the British navy is determined to continue fighting for the dominions;

Regardless of the outcome of the battle of the Mediterranean, Anglo-American relations will become closer for the purpose of strengthening the unity of British with its white populated colonies. Canada and Australia have increasing authority in the Empire, and concessions have been made to them.

Progress in Anglo-American unity is being made, with a tendency toward economic union and a pooling of resources similar to that offered France.

The situation of the alien races in the British colonies, especially in the Arab and Islamic regions, is becoming more serious.

A bitter struggle can be expected. This point should be considered with relation to our all-Asiatic policy. As in the case of our China policy, Japan must support Asiatics exclusively, and make necessary preparations.

The exhaustion and destruction of the war are becoming grave. If we enter the war our national strength will be spent. The Italian defeat is an example. As time goes on, British and American interest in the Far East will decline.

With the Chungking government destroyed Japan's attack on Singapore can be carried out, and the Anglo-American-Chinese problem settled. We should concentrate on our basic China policy as it links up with the others. Also, Japan's basic policies have propaganda uses; the Anglo-American side thinks our policies are due to German encouragement in their war of nerves. Later the foregoing natural tendency of Britain and American should preferably be furthered, and utilized in aiming at a solution of our just policy toward China and the China problem.

III. An essential factor in the ultimate conclusion of the war is that the struggle between the Anglo Saxons and Teutons will continue for some time and there will be no important change.

Page A-162

IV. German-Soviet relations are fundamentally discordant and will become increasingly so as the war continues and Soviet national strength and its position are improved.

[a] Not available.

Trans. 5-19-41

No. 308

FROM: London (Japanese Ambassador)

TO: Washington (Japanese Ambassador)

April 27, 1941

No number.

Action Tokyo as # 305 (Abstract).

Japanese Ambassador informs Churchill that England and the United States are obstructing Japan's peace efforts by (1) giving aid to the Chungking government for the purpose of prolonging disorder in China and by (2) bringing economic pressure against Japan in order to weaken her position.

Trans. 5-2-41

No.  309

FROM: Tokyo

TO: Berlin

May 5, 1941

# 374.

Please transmit to Foreign Minister Ribbentrop separate telegram # 375 [a] as my personal message to Chancellor Hitler. Please also convey as my personal words, my sincere desire that Chancellor Hitler and Foreign Minister Ribbentrop will continue to exercise restraint, although I fully appreciate that from the standpoint of Germany, the resentment would be difficult to suppress. It goes without saying, but please take note of the attitude and intentions of Hitler, Ribbentrop, and the heads of the Army and Navy, regarding the so-called "U.S. patrol" and report same.

[a] See I, 310.

Trans. 5-7-41

No. 310

FROM: Tokyo

TO: Berlin

May 5, 1941

# 375.

(In 2 parts—complete).

Part 1.

Translator's note: Part 1 is garbled and only approximate translation is possible.

Matsuoka's message to Hitler congratulating him on the clear-cut declaration of Axis intentions in the speech he made on the 4th. Particularly his rebuke directed against the President of the United States for the outrages committed against Germany. Matsuoka claims that he has been doing all he can to make clear Japan's intentions in order to seek reconsideration of the attitude on the part of the President of the United States, etc.

Page A-163

Part 2.

The recent outrage of the President of the United States is just about driving me to despair, but there still remains one ray of hope. Indeed, it is my desire that it shall not be lost! Therefore, on the occasion of my visit to Ise Shrine I prayed that God have compassion on my suffering and understand my innermost thoughts. In comparing President Roosevelt's speech at Staunton with Your Excellency's, both of which reached Japan on the same day, I was greatly impressed by the wire difference that exists, both in the details and temper, between these two speeches, for which I am sincerely grateful. (This difference was felt immediately, by every one and I am certain that it has had a great effect on my countrymen.)

In order to express my sincere congratulations and my deep appreciation of Your Excellency's speech I am addressing this, my personal communication, to Your Excellency.

Trans. 5-7-41

No. 311

FROM: Berlin (Japanese Ambassador)

TO: Tokyo (Gaimudaijin)

May 7, 1941

# 496.

(Part 1 of 2, Part 2 not available).

Re your # 374 [a].

According to your instructions, I immediately conveyed your message to Foreign Minister Ribbentrop. For your information I am adding my impressions.

 1. Your Minister received the impression that the introduction of Hitler's speech was in tended to restrain America. However, as I see it, Hitler was attacking the democracies as being in the hands of the Jews and moneyed plutocrats. Not only that, but he attacked openly those who would lead America into war. Again in his speech of January 30th of this year he declared that if America started to convoy, he would use submarines and aircraft to destroy the convoys. This was simply a statement of fact patent to everyone. That it was not intended to provoke America to war goes without saying, for Germany has been very careful in her attitude  toward America not to provoke her needlessly. However, I believe that this attitude is absolutely not one of deference toward America.

----- (Part 2 not available).

[a] See I, 309.

Trans. 5-12-41

No.  312

FROM: Tokyo (Konoe)

TO: Moscow

March 18,1941

# 40.

(Confidential)—(exchange of notes).

Monseigneur le commissair of the people. Wire reference to article of the trade agreement signed this day between Japan and the Union of Soviet Socialistic Republics. I have the honor, under instructions from my government to confirm to you the following understanding between the two governments.

Page A-164

The Government of the Soviet Union shall open a special account in a Japanese bank for the purpose of facilitating and assuring the execution of Article 4 of the said agreement. I have the honor to request you to be so good as to confirm the above understanding. I avail myself ----- Monsieur l'ambassador, I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of Your Excellency's note of today's date in which Your Excellency has informed me as follows, "With reference to ----- of ----- of ----- I have the honor to further the above understanding between the two governments. I avail myself -----.

Trans. 3-21-41

No. 313

FROM: Tokyo (Konoe)

TO: Moscow

March 18, 1941

# 40.

(Part 1 of 6).

Trade agreement between Japan and the Union of Soviet Socialistic Republics. The Government of Japan and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialistic Republics, being desirous of promoting trade between the two countries, and desirous of securing articles necessary for them, have agreed upon the following articles.

Article 1.

The products of the Soviet Union, categories and value of which shall be agreed upon for each treaty year, shall be exported to Japan in the course of the corresponding treaty year in conformity with the laws and regulations of the Union. The products of Japan, categories and in line of which shall be agreed upon for each treaty year, shall be exported to the Soviet Union in the course of the corresponding treaty year in conformity with the laws and regulations of Japan. The value referred to in the two preceding paragraphs shall be calculated on the C.I.F. (cost insurance freight) basis.

  Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire

Trans. 3-31-41